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Moral Status of Animals
Introduction
Human beings tend to mingle with the non-humans in various manners. Some animals, such as cats and dogs, reside in our home surroundings under our care and attention. Moreover, other animals, such as the mice usually exist in our homes as unwelcomed residents who occupied some spaces in our houses. Still, other animals such as the chicken, pigs, and cattle are animal breeds that are kept in our homes due to the human consumption of some of the animal products such as milk, meat, and eggs. Human beings use a different type of animals for experimental purposes in laboratories. Human beings hunt some animals for sports purposes or used for entertainment reasons in circuses, films, and zoos. However, some people believed that it is factual some and maybe all of the human-animal interactions are deemed morally problematic, yet other people perceived that at least and perhaps all of the animals animal-human interactions are deemed morally permissible (Garner 464). The essay entails the examination of the diverse viewpoints regarding the ethics of human-animal interactions and even explore the various rationales that support all the perspectives.
There are no regular duties to animals. This is also known as the exceptionalism. We can differentiate the three sets of views concerning the moral status of animals that are arranged on a spectrum. In the long run, one end of the spectrum is exceptionalism, whereby the non-human animals have no moral status.
Additionally, human beings do not have any moral duties to animals. This is to mean that human beings depict themselves to be exceptional and any emerging moral obligations that entail animals are derivative (Aaltola and Wahlberg 97). An instance of this interaction is where it is considered wrong to injure your dog. It is depicted in that dimension that the rationale behind is that doing so would wrong you and not just due to the dog being mistreated.
Multiple exceptionalists assert that actually, animals fail to satisfy some basic requirements for existing as moral subjects-entailing the characters who are owed the moral duties. The exceptionalists tend to believe that all the ethical obligations and responsibilities are influenced by a social contract existing and also that the animals happen to be excluded as moral subjects. The rationale behind this is that the animals do not have the full capacity to enter into contracts deemed the social contracts between humans and animals (Degrazia 24). Moreover, the exceptionalists also tend to believe that for the essence of having morally considerable interests, a character must have preferences. This is to depict the fact that they have to be in a position to articulate their moral suggestions on in the potentiality to explore all that is involved in ethics. Also, the animals tend to lack the essential feature and potentiality. Therefore, it is wise to state that we all have associated moral duties to any character only if the character has a specific property P. All existing human beings have the property P. However, significant non-human animals and almost all of them tend to lack the feature P. Such non-human animals include dogs, cats, and chicken. Thus, we as human beings have an obligation to human beings though not morally obligated to the non-human animals.
Abolitionism and welfarism. This entails the duties to animals. Along with the other existing extreme of the spectrum is abolitionism, in reference to whereby the non-human animals attain a moral status that is incompatible with the incorporation of animals as a resource material for human beings. Thus, the use and consumption of animals by human beings has to be abolished all over the universe. The abolitionists tend to be dedicated and highly associated with veganism. Thus, the abandonment of all the acts that entail the instrumentalization of the animals for the essence of human desires being met thoroughly.
All the perspectives that exist in abolitionism and exceptionalism are the primary dimensions of welfarism. On the other side of the coin, the welfarists tend to decline the ideologies of excepotionalists, which state that we do not have any moral obligations to animals. Moreover, the welfarists are against the idea that animals be incorporated as resources as long as the animals are not exposed to a lot of suffering in unnecessary situations. Usually, there is a lot of space for the seasonal changes among the welfarists. This is concerning how they elucidate the perspectives such as the no option suffering notion. Other welfarsits tend to be vegetarians, whereas various types of them take part in the farming of animals, hunting the animals for sport and incorporate the animals into their laboratory experimentation.
The welfarists and abolitionists tend to perceive that for an assertion such as the self-awareness, the potentiality to use a particular language and the brilliance, there exist specific humans who have inadequate qualities to at least the same extent that various non-human animals do not have. Then, if it is wrong morally to portray the humans in manners that we usually handle the non-human animals, thus, it illustrates the thoughts of being morally allowed to handle the animals in the various ways (Rowlands 16). The rationale behind this is that the only distinction that exists between the multiple types of human and non-human creatures is the membership status of the species, respectively. This does not in any way project to be morally relevant in itself as the species is a biological class and not a moral type. Thus, the exploration may provide a solution to the exceptionalist. However, what may the welfarists and abolitionists depict their individual opinions regarding the issue. Here is a primary instance of a discussion that also the animals are associated with the moral sense. Animals can encounter pain, pain is disturbing to any creatures existing out there, and it is thus considered wrong to expose any individual to anything bad without an appropriate rationale behind this act. Thus, it is deemed to be wrong to inflict pain to the animals minus any relevant support claims.
Our moral obligations to the animals will, therefore, be on the basis on whatever rationales are counted as a good reason for inflicting the pain. This will only count if some other common argument is persuasive to human beings. Under this situation, there is a high possibility of disagreement that exists among the welfarists and the abolitionists. In this instance, the welfarists may perceive that if at all the animal experimentation results into the treatment of dangerous human infections, then it is morally justified for animal experimentation to be conducted as there is an explainable rationale behind the pain inflicted to the animals. The abolitionists thus assert that there is no valuable rationale in this situation, and therefore the evidence for that suggests that we would perceive that it is actually wrong to bring about the same extent of pain inflicted to a part of population of the humans against their will for the essence of enhancing the treatment of the same infections.
The welfarists and abolitionists also often disagreed if premature death is wrong for animals using the same perspective that applies to human beings. Several welfarists perceived that when animals are not in the capacity to reflect on their futures, they do not stand a position to be wronged by being exposed to death prematurely (Sharpe 113). The abolitionists thus assert that an animal can possess an interest in the future even though not in the position to contemplate the future; therefore, being killed may turn out to be bad for the animal. Thus, the abolitionists seem to oppose the painless murder of the animals for the essence of human consumption.
Conclusion
The moral status of animals is depicted as a complex and contested terrain. Moreover, there are two different perspectives of the debate. Thus, the existing disagreements between the welfarists and the exceptionalists for the essence of each group projecting individual ideas in support of their claims regarding the moral status of animals. The exceptionalist tries to depict the rare trait of human beings from the non-human animals in reference to moral status. On the other side, the welfarist try to justify the point that the non-humans also deserve our moral duty as they are the same as human animals in various forms.
Works Cited
Aaltola, E. L. I. S. A., and B. Wahlberg. “Non-human animals: Legal status and moral considerations.” Retfærd. Nordisk juridisk Tidsskrift 38 (2015): 83-104.
DeGrazia, David. “Modal personhood and moral status: A reply to Kagan’s proposal.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 33.1 (2016): 22-25.
Garner, Robert. “Animals and democratic theory: Beyond an anthropocentric account.” Contemporary Political Theory 16.4 (2017): 459-477.
Rowlands, Mark. Can animals be moral?. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Sharpe, Lynne. Creatures Like Us?: A Relational Approach to the Moral Status of Animals. Andrews UK Limited, 2015.
